This paper studies an incompletely informed regulator's problem of inducing a firm producing durable pollution to adopt a socially optimal pollution storage technology.
1. Introduction
Modelling durability
In this paper we set up and solve the regulator's optimal contracting problem when faced with a rm producing durable pollution. Once created, a durable pollutant survives for some length of time before decaying, thus forcing society to manage the resulting stock over time. As our model accommodates any nite autonomous rate of decay of pollutants, the only pollutants left out of its ambit are those with an in nite autonomous rate of decay, i.e., those that are purely evanescent and dissipate instantaneously.
At any instant, an existing unit of durable pollution can either be managed by the rm or emitted into the public stock (the \environment"). We say that a unit of durable pollution is managed by the rm if it does so internally or delegates this function to an agent who is paid by the rm for this task. As long as a unit of pollution is under the management of the rm or its agent, it is said to bein the private stock. We postulate that only the public stock of pollution is a matter of social concern as it creates negative externalities.
The signi cant distinction between the two courses of action open to the rm at any instant is that a unit of pollution in the private stock imposes a persistent cost over its lifetime while emitting it implies a one-time cost. This cost structure implies that the rm faces a dynamic optimization problem whose solution at every instant depends on the past via the inherited private pollution stock and expectations about the future evolution of the stock. Moreover, if the relevant insurance markets and contracts are incomplete, then the rm faces residual uncertainty regarding many of the factors that determine its operational environment and production of pollution e.g., the quality of delivered inputs, the e cacy of pollution treatment t e c hnology, production uctuations in response to market conditions, etc. We represent these uncertainties by specifying an explicitly stochastic operational environment for the rm. In addition, the regulator's information about this stochastic environment m a y be inferior to that of the rm. We capture this asymmetry of information by endowing the rm with private information regarding the parameters determining the rm's stochastic operational environment. Our model of the rm's environment is explicitly reduced-form and statistical in nature, with the rm seen as a black-box that produces and manages its pollution stock. One reason for adopting this approach is that it allows us to focus sharply on the only aspect of the rm that is relevant to the pollution regulator. Indeed, our statistical modelling of the rm's pollution-related activities is intended to describe a regulator's quantitative perception of a polluting rm. Apart from its descriptive simplicity, our direct approach has the merit of being analytically tractable for many v ersions of the regulator's problem. Finally, as the model is stated in terms of statistical parameters that can be estimated routinely, w e expect that its solution can be calibrated, perturbed, tested and applied quite routinely.
The regulation problem
The durable pollution created by the rm ows into its private pollution stock. 1 Given a unit of pollution in the private stock, the rm may continue to hold it, entailing an instantaneous holding cost h, or emit it into the public stock, entailing an emission penalty l. The rm pays the holding cost on a unit of pollution as long as it stays in the private stock, while the emission penalty is a one-time charge that permanently relieves the rm of the responsibility of managing that unit. l is given exogenously and is interpreted as the social cost entailed by a unit of pollution in the public stock.
h represents the storage technology chosen by the rm for its private pollution stock. In order to acquire technology h, the rm must invest (h) up-front, where is a decreasing function. Thus, the rm can lower the holding cost it bears on each unit of pollution in its private stock by investing more in storage technology.
We restrict attention to the trade-o between private management and emission by assuming away the possibility of adjusting the rm's production plan. 2 This independence of the rm's production activity f r o m i t s pollution management activity i s implicit in our assumption that the random evolution of the rm's private pollution stock is governed by exogenously given parameters x, and . Let v(x ) b e the exogenously given value of the rm's operations in the private good market, let V (x ) be the exogenously given value of the rm to consumers, and let C(x h 0 l ) b e the rm's cost of optimally managing its private pollution stock, where is the rm's in nite horizon discount rate. 3 x 2 < + is the rm's type (or private information). As we assume that , , and l are exogenously given and common knowledge, we suppress these parameters and denote rm x's market value prior to regulation by v(x), its value to consumers by V (x), the cost of optimally managing its private pollution stock by c(x h) = C(x h 0 l ) (1:2:1) and its utility from outcome (h T) b y u(x h T) = v(x) ; c(x h) ; (h) + T
(1:2:2)
where T is a transfer from the regulator to the rm. A pair h< + (h T)i is called a direct mechanism, with message space < + that coincides with the type space and outcome function (h T) : < + ! < + < w e also refer to outcome functions as contracts. We restrict attention to direct mechanisms without loss of generality because of the revelation principle. 4
Given h< + (h T)i, rm x's utility f r o m reporting type x 0 is U(x x 0 ) = u(x h(x 0 ) T (x 0 )).
We consider mechanisms that induce participation and self-selection by all types. The individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints that characterize such contracts are: for all x x 0 2 < + U(x x) 0 and U(x x) U(x x 0 )
(1:2:3)
3 The signi cance and interpretation of the argument 0 will become clear in Section 2.2.
4 This basic principle of mechanism design theory (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) may be stated informally as follows: given the type-contingent outcomes resulting from an equilibrium of the game generated by an arbitrary mechanism, there exists a direct mechanism, i.e., one in which the message spaces coincide with the type spaces, such that (a) truth-telling is an equilibrium of the game generated by this direct mechanism, and (b) the type-contingent outcomes resulting from the truth-telling equilibrium replicate the given type-contingent outcomes. This simpli es the search for an optimal mechanism in two ways. First, one needs to optimize only over the class of direct mechanisms, indeed, only over the class of (direct) outcome functions as the message spaces coincide with the type spaces. Secondly, the restriction to a truth-telling equilibrium allows incentive constraints to be speci ed simply as the self-selection constraints.
The regulator's welfare is
where 1 + , with > 0, is the social shadow value per unit of payment by the regulator to the rm. The regulator's problem is to nd (h T) : < + ! < + < to maximize the expectation of (1.2.4), subject to constraints (1.2.3). It will turn out in our model that a rm's emission activity i s p o s i t i v ely related to its chosen h. The regulator's interest in the rm's choice of h stems from the following tradeo implied by the negative s l o p e o f and the positive association between h and the rm's emissions: high investment (h) in storage technology implies a low holding cost h and low emissions, thereby implying a low social cost caused by emissions (captured by the emission penalty paid by the rm), while low investment (h) i n storage technology implies a high holding cost h and high emissions, thereby implying a high social cost caused by emissions. Since the rm's investment cost and holding cost, as well as the social cost of emissions, enter the regulator's welfare function, the regulator needs to compute the optimal tradeo subject to the implementability constraints imposed by information asymmetries and incentive requirements.
The regulatory framework described above modi es a simple Pigovian tax scheme. We show in Section 3 that, if the regulator's information about the rm is incomplete, then optimal regulation requires that the Pigovian tax besupplemented by a transfer scheme designed to induce the rm to adopt the socially desirable storage technology.
The literature
This paper is concerned with the problem of regulating \point-source stock pollution" (Xepapadeas 1997) , i.e., the pollutant is durable and the emitter's identity and the quantity of emissions are perfectly observable. Our approach to this problem departs from the dynamic emission choice model (DECM) in a numberof directions. 5 Unfortunately, while the DECM is couched in the capital theoretic formalism of optimal growth models, the substantive features of our approach require us to employ the game theoretic formalism of optimal regulation theory (La ont and Tirole 1994) . This means that our model and the DECM are formally non-comparable and non-nested. Nevertheless, it is possible to understand the substantive di erences by considering the following abstract representation of the DECM.
Consider a regulator facing a rm producing durable pollution. Let the public stock of pollution be the state variable and the emission rate the control variable. Given the control trajectory and the state trajectory S, t h e regulator's welfare is w( S x), where x is a parameter describing the rm. The law of motion for the state imposes a dynamic constraint in the form of a di erential equation, say L( S) = 0 . The regulator's optimal control trajectory (x) maximizes w( S x) subject to the constraint L( S) = 0. With appropriate speci cations, as in Xepapadeas 1997, this is an optimal control problem.
The substantive question with respect to this model is whether the regulator can induce rm x to choose the regulator's preferred control (x)? Given standard speci cations, the regulator can decentralize (x) b y imposing a Pigovian tax trajectory (x), whose value at time t is the social shadow cost of the pollution stock at time t. This implementation of (x) relies on the following substantive features of the DECM: (a) x is common knowledge, (b) all produced pollution is emitted, (c) the rm's decision problem at each instant is static, and (d) the rm is a price-taker. Our model di ers from the DECM in all these aspects.
First, unlike the DECM, our model features incomplete information, with x as the rm's private information. Consequently, it is impossible for the regulator to implement the socially optimal emissions trajectory (x) via Pigovian taxes that are conditioned on x. Secondly, feature (b) of the DECM implies that the entire output of pollution causes a negative externality, and therefore is a matter of social and regulatory concern. Our model introduces an alternative to socially undesirable emission in the form of the possibility of the rm holding the pollution. Thirdly, the choice between holding pollution and emission, with their di erent cost implications, confronts the rm with a dynamic decision problem at every moment.
As will beshown in Section 2, the rm's emission activity i s positively related to the holding cost h. Therefore, the rm in our model will behave l i k e the rm in the DECM by emitting almost all the pollution it creates if the holding cost is high relative to the emission penalty. Thus, the rm's postulated behavior in the DECM can emerge endogenously in our model as the rm's rational response to particular regulatory incentives and economic circumstances. Apart from the practical applicability of the model and our enrichment of the description of a polluting rm's environment by placing it in a dynamic stochastic context, we see our enrichment of the regulatory setting (e.g., introduction of incomplete information) as the major departure of our model from the DECM.
Plan of paper and results
Section 2 of this paper answers the following question: given the rm's operational environment and its pollution processing technology, what is the optimal policy for the rm with respect to the decision whether to emit pollution or to process it internally? We follow Harrison and Taylor 1978 in deriving the answer, which is stated as Theorem 2.3.21. The methodology is to construct a stochastic dynamic programming problem whose solution yields the rm's optimal policy and cost as functions of technological and regulatory parameters.
Section 3 characterizes the optimal regulatory contracts subject to implementability constraints. The cost function derived in Section 2 is the key to the de nition and analysis of the incentive constraints in this section. We consider two contracting problems, one with a nite numberoftypes and the other with a continuum of types. The optimal contract for the former problem is stated in Theorem 3.3.13, while the solution of the latter problem is contained in Theorem 3.4.14.
Section 4 concludes the paper with suggestions for extensions of the work reported in this paper.
The rm's cost function

Formal setting
In this section we i n troduce the formalism and notation that will be used throughout this paper. Z + (resp. Z ++ ) denotes the set of nonnegative (resp. positive) integers, < (resp. < + , < ++ ) the set of real (resp. nonnegative real, positive real) numbers, D and D 2 are the rst order and second order di erential operators respectively, denotes a jump of a real-valued variable, and h: :i denotes the predictable quadratic variation process (Elliott 1982, Chapter 10) . t denotes an instant of time unless otherwise speci ed, t 2 < + .
Let be the set of continuous real-valued functions with domain < + . holding cost of the pollution stock x 2 < + beH(x) = hx. The penalty f o r emitting a unit of pollution is l.
Let T 0 = 0. Given n 2 Z ++ and a stopping time T n;1 , de ne T n = infft > T n;1 j Z t 6 = Z t; g. Thus, T n is the random time of the n-th jump in the value of Z. Associate with T n the random variable Z T n = Z T n ; Z T n ; 2 F T n , which describes the size of the jump in the value of Z at T n . De ne R L T n = Z T n _ 0 and L T n = ;( Z T n^0 ). R T n (resp. L T n ) is the size of the upward (resp. downward) jump of Z at T n . Given t 2 < + , let N(t) = supfn 2 Z + j T n tg this random variable counts the number of jumps of Z upto time t. Thus, P N(t) n=0 R T n (resp. P N(t) n=0 L T n ) i s t h e s u m o f t h e u p wards (resp. downwards) jumps in Z and R (resp. L) upto time t. These de nitions allow u s to decompose R and L into continuous and jump parts as follows:
L T n where t and t are the continuous components of R t and L t respectively.
We note the following facts. As R and L are non-decreasing, they are of bounded variation therefore, so is R;L. As W is a continuous martingale and R;L is of bounded variation, Z is a semimartingale (Elliott 1982, Chapter 12) . Given that all processes in this paper are adapted to (F t ) and right-continuous, they are progressively measurable (Elliott 1982 , Theorem 2.32).
Cost formulation
We calculate the rm's cost of managing the private pollution stock as follows: a u n i t of pollution is charged h for every instant that it stays in the stock and is charged l when it leaves the stock. Consequently, the cost of implementing a feasible control process L until time t is and the cost of implementing it over < + is
Now consider the following cost formulation. Interpret R as the process of cumulative injections into the private stock and L as the process of cumulative emissions from the private stock. Suppose every unit of pollution injected into the stock is charged c 2 as an entry fee when it enters the stock, is charged holding cost c 1 while it stays in the stock, and is charged an emission penalty c 3 when it leaves the stock. The resulting`cost' of implementing L 2 L (x ) u n til time t is C t (L x c 1 c 2 c 3 ) = c 1 The actual cost formula (2.2.1) amounts to setting c 1 = h, c 2 = 0 and c 3 = l.
Given the cost parameters used in (2.2.1) and the formulation (2.2.3), consider the following arti cial method of calculating the`cost' of managing the private pollution stock. Suppose every unit of pollution injected into the stock is charged the in nite horizon holding cost h= as entry fee when it enters the stock, is charged the modi ed holding cost 0 while it stays in the stock, and is charged a modi ed emission penalty, l minus the implicit saving of the in nite horizon holding cost h= , when it leaves the stock. 6 The which amounts to setting c 1 = 0, c 2 = h= and c 3 = l ; h= in the formulation (2.2.3).
The following result connects the actual cost (2.2.1) with the arti cial formulation (2.2.4) which we shall use extensively in Section 2.3.
If L 2 L(x ) and S 0 are such that Z t = X t + R t ; L t 2 0 S ] for every t 2 < + , then lim sup t"1 e ; t E(R ; L) t = 0 .
(C) If L = 0 , then lim sup t"1 e ; t E(R ; L) t = l i m s u p t"1 e ; t E R t = 0 .
This means that the actual and arti cial cost formulations, (2.2.1) and (2.2.4), are identical in the limit, modulo a constant.
Optimal policy and the cost function
The following basic lemma is a consequence of the change-of-variable formula of stochastic calculus.
Lemma 2.3.1. Let We use this lemma to characterize a lower bound on the cost of implementing a feasible control policy. We shall go on to construct a control policywhose cost attains this lower bound, implying that it is an optimal policy. Theorem 2.3.21 states the optimal control policy and the resulting cost function. Lemma 2.3.2. (Optimality criterion) Suppose : < + ! < is such that (a) 2 C 2 (< + <), (b) ; D l ; , and (c) ; 0. If L is a feasible control policy, then (x) E C 1 (L x 0 l ; ) for every x 2 < + .
Given S > 0, let f(: S) : < + ! < besuch that Df(0 S) = ; Df(S S) = l ;
and ;f(x S) = 0 (2:3:3)
for every x 2 (0 S ). Given S 2 < ++ , a n d f(: S) that solves (2.3.3), de ne F(: S) : < + ! < by
The roots of the characteristic polynomial of ;f(: S) are 1 = ; ; < 0 and 2 = ; + > 0, where = = 2 and = ( 2 + 2 = 2 ) 1=2
Given S > 0, the unique solution of (2. The next result shows that F de ned by (2.3.4) satis es assumptions (a), (b) and (c) of Lemma 2.3.2.
Lemma 2.3.9. Suppose > l, S is the unique solution of (2.3.7), f(: S) is de ned by (2.3.5), and F(: S) is de ned by (2.3.4). Then, (A) F(: S) 2 C 2 (< + <), (B) ; DF(: S) l ; , and (C) ;F (: S) 0.
Combining Lemmas 2.3.2 and 2.3.9, we immediately have Lemma 2.3.10. Suppose > l, S is the unique solution of (2.3.7), f(: S) is de ned by (2.3.5), and F(: S) is de ned by (2.3.4). Then,
for every x 2 < + and feasible control policyL.
We now construct a feasible control policy L such that equality holds in (2.3.11). By Lemma 2.3.10, this policy will be an optimal control policy.
Let S > 0 begiven by (2.3.7). For every t 2 < + , l e t L t = sup X u + R u ; S] + j u 2 0 t ] (2:3:12) This amounts to imposing an upper re ecting barrier on Z at S. Informally, L grows only at random times when Z hits the upper barrier S and X is rising, with the rise in L being just su cient to exactly o set the growth of X. Lemma 2.3.13. Suppose S > 0.
(A) If R and L satisfy (2.1.1) and (2.3.12) for every t 2 < + , then L is a continuous feasible control policy with R 0 = 0 and L 0 = X 0 ; S] + .
(B) There exists a unique solution of (2.1.1) and (2.3.12). (C) Suppose > l , S > 0 is the unique solution of (2.3.7), f is de ned by (2.3.3), F is de ned by (2.3.4), and (R L) is the unique solution of (2.1.1) and (2.3.12) given S. Then, for every x 2 < + , E C 1 (L x 0 l ; ) = F(x) Lemmas 2.3.10 and 2.3.13(C) yield the rm's cost function when > l . We now turn to the problem when l.
Let : < ! < besuch that
for every x 2 < + . It is easy to check that the unique solution of (2.3.14) is (x) = + e ;( + )x (2:3:15)
The following lemma notes that satis es the assumptions of Lemma 2. Theorem 2.3.21. Given parameters (x h 0 l ), the unique optimal control policy when l < h= is given by (2.3.12) and the unique optimal control policywhen l h= is given by (2.3.19), with cost function
We conclude this section by noting some properties of the cost function. 
3. Regulation problem
Formulation
We employ the notation and formalism outlined in Section 1.2. The rm's value prior to environmental regulation is given by v : < + ! <, the cost of managing the rm's internal pollution stock by c : < 2 + ! <, and the price paid by the rm for processing technology by : < + ! < .
Assumption 3.1.2. V , v, and u satisfy the following hypotheses.
(a) V is continuous, (b) 
Preliminaries
The rm's utility function u : < + H < ! < is given by (1.2.2) and the regulator's welfare function W : < 2 + < ! < is given by (1.2.4). The IR and IC constraints that induce participation and self-selection by all types are given by (1.2.3). If truth-telling is incentive compatible, then the regulator's welfare can bewritten as
The following is a characterization of contracts that satisfy the IC constraint for all types.
Lemma 3.2.2. Given contract (h T), U(x x) = supfU(x x 0 ) j x 0 2 < + g for every x 2 < + i . D 2 U(x x) = 0 for every x 2 < + and h is non-increasing.
Pigovian regulation
Suppose the rm pays the social cost l for each emitted unit of pollution without a transfer. Consequently, rm x selects h 2 < + to maximize u( Complete information regulation Alternatively, suppose the regulator has complete information. Knowing x, the regulator o ers a contract (h T) = (h x T x ), which is chosen to maximize W(x h T) subject to the IR constraint u(x h T) 0. The second condition is identical to (3.2.3), which implies that h x = h (x). The rst condition amounts to setting u(x h x T x ) = u(x h x 0) + T x = 0 , i.e., T x = ;u(x h x 0) = ;u(x h (x) 0) < 0. The regulator's welfare is
Consequently, social welfare is higher under complete information regulation than under Pigovian regulation.
3.3 Contracting under incomplete information: discrete case Assumption 3.3.1. x x 2 < + such that x < x, and F is a distribution function on < + such that supp F = fx xg and F(x ) = p 2 (0 1).
In this section, the rm's type is x 2 f x xg, which is private information, and F is the regulator's belief about x, which is common knowledge. Consider an equilibrium in which the regulator o ers a contract f(h T ) ( h T)g, rm x chooses (h T ) and rm x chooses ( h T). In such an equilibrium, the following conditions must hold:
u(x h T ) 0 (3:3:2) u( x h T) 0 (3:3:3) u(x h T ) u(x h T) (3:3:4) u( x h T) u( x h T ) (3:3:5) Comparing (3.3.11 ) and (3.3.12) with (3.2.3), we have h = h x and h h x , i.e., relative to the full information choices, type x's choice is not distorted while type x 's choice is distorted upwards. We collect these facts in the following result.
Contracting under incomplete information: continuum case
In this section we consider the optimal mechanism design problem with a continuum of types. Our rst objective is to derive necessary conditions that an optimal mechanism must satisfy, assuming that one exists. Our analysis of these conditions yields useful qualitative information about the optimal mechanism, which is reported in Theorem 3.4.14. Our second objective is Theorem 3.4.15 which establishes the existence of an optimal mechanism.
Assumption 3.4.1. F is a distribution function on < + such that (a) supp F = X = x 0 x 1 ] < ++ , and (b) F is twice di erentiable, with f(x) = DF(x) > 0 and DG(x) < 0 for x 2 (x 0 x 1 ), where G(x) = 1 ; F(x)]=f(x).
F is the regulator's belief about the rm's type x. (a) serves two main purposes. First, it is used in the proof of Theorem 3.4.15. Secondly, it is a simplifying assumption that permits sharper statement of results for instance, if X is replaced by < + , then some of the strict inequalities have to be weakened and some statements in this section (e.g., transversality conditions) have to be replaced by analogous limit statements. DG<0 i s a standard monotone hazard rate condition that is satis ed by many familiar distributions (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 1989) . The following assumption is used in the proof of Theorem 3.4.15. Remark. In De nition 3.4.6, (3.4.5) can be replaced by (3.4.7) without loss of generality. Suppose (h U y) solves the regulator's problem and h(x 0 ) < h. We derive the usual Moreover, for almost every x 2 X, y = y(x) minimizes H(x h(x) U(x) (x) (x) y) subject to the constraint y 0. This is equivalent to y = y(x) maximizing (x)y subject 8 In this section, \almost all/every" refers to Lebesgue measure.
to the constraint y 0. If (x) > 0, then a maximum does not exist. Consequently, we must have (x) 0 for almost every x 2 X. To sum up, in Regime 1, h is positive and decreasing, is zero, U is non-negative and increasing, and is positive and decreasing.
Regime 2: y(x) = 0 Consider x 2 X such that y(x) = 0 . Let x 0 = s u p ( X ; y ;1 (0)) \ x 0 x ] and x 00 = i n f ( X ; y ;1 (0)) \ x x 1 ] By de nition, there exists a sequence (x n ) i n ( X ; y ;1 (0)) \ x 0 x ] s u c h that lim n"1 x n = x 0 . By de nition, y(x n ) > 0 for every n 2 Z ++ . It follows that (x n ) = 0 for every n 2 Z ++ . By the continuity of , (x 0 ) = lim n"1 (x n ) = 0. Similarly, (x 00 ) = 0. As Dh(x) = ;y(x) = 0 for every x 2 (x 0 x 00 ), h(x) is some constant 0 for every x 2 (x 0 x 00 ). (3.4.8) yields To sum up, in Regime 2, h is a constant 0, is non-positive, U is non-negative and increasing, and is positive and decreasing.
Theorem 3.4.14. Suppose Assumptions 3.1.2 and 3.4.1 hold, and fh U g is the regulator's optimal contract. Then, (A) decreases monotonically from at x 0 to 0 at x 1 set = 1 in (3.4.10). We have so far characterized an optimal contract assuming that one exists. So, is there an optimal contract? We a n s w er this question in two steps: (a) the set of admissible state-control pairs is nonempty, and (b) there is an admissible state-control pair that solves the regulator's problem.
Consider the state-control pair (h U y), where h(x) = h=2, U(x) = R x 0 x] dy Dv(y) ; D 1 c(y h=2)] and y(x) = 0 for every x 2 X. It is trivial to check that (h U y) is an admissible state-control pair.
The following existence result is an application of an extension of Filippov's existence theorem (Cesari 1983, Theorem 9.3 .i). 
Extensions
Variations on the above regulatory model are possible by replacing x with , or as the rm's private information. The choice of x as private information allows rather straightforward analytical solution of the model. Our analysis of the other choices, which we do not report in this paper, points to the resulting model being very di cult to analyze with purely analytical techniques the reason is that S varies with , and , but not with x. The other cases require analytical techniques to be supplemented by exact/approximate numerical techniques for the determination of the optimal contract.
An important theoretical extension of this model would beto consider a situation in which a regulator faces many rms. Even if the rms do not interact directly, they will be connected via the regulator's budget constraint and the fact that all the rms' emissions add to the same public stock of pollution.
Another theoretical extension is to endogenize the mandated clean-up technology for public pollution by choosing l to maximize some speci ed social welfare function.
Finally, numerical analysis and application of the solution proposed in this paper would be of great interest. For instance, one could numerically calculate and analyze Regimes 1 and 2 of Section 3.4. Since the rm's pollution-producing technology is represented by a few easily measurable statistical parameters, this sparse and direct, yet exible, conceptualization of the relevant aspects of the rm should allow straightforward quantitative application of our results. Taking expectations and letting t " 1 , yields the desired formula.
(B) Note that E(R ; L) t = E(Z ; X) t . Clearly, lim sup t"1 e ; t E Z t = 0 as Z is bounded. As E X t = x + t + E W t = x + t, we have lim sup t"1 e ; t E X t = 0 . (C) In this proof we shall appeal to some formulae stated in Karatzas and Shreve (1988) . While the cited formulae refer to the maximum process and the process of passage times associated with the Wiener process, we adapt the formulae for our purposes without formal proof by appealing to the strong Markov property and re ection principle associated with the Wiener process (Karatzas and Shreve 1988, Section 2.6).
Let L = 0 . De ne m X t = inffX u j u 2 0 t ]g for t 0, and 0 = infft 0 j X t = 0 g. As x 0, we have 0 R t = ;m X t_ 0 for every t 0.
First consider the problem with < 0. Let = infft ;x= j W t = 0g. By the strong Markov property of W, we have < 1, Q-a.s. (Karatzas and Shreve 1988, Remark 8.3 in Section 2.8). As < 0, we have X = x + + W = x + x + (;x= ) = 0 . Therefore, 0
. It follows that t _ 0 t _ for every t 0, which implies 0 R t = ;m X t_ 0 ;m X t_ for every t 0. Thus, it is su cient to show that lim t"1 e ; t E m X t_ = 0 .
Let m W t = inffW u j u 2 0 t ]g for t 0. De ne the passage time n = infft 0 j W t = ;ng for n 2 Z ++ . It is easy to con rm that E e ; n m W n = ;nEe ; n = ;ne ;n p 2 (Karatzas and Shreve 1988, (8.6) in Section 2.8). Consequently, It follows that Q lim k"1 m W t k = ;1 = 1 . For k 2 Z ++ , let n(k) = s u p fn 2 Z + j ; n m W t k g. As lim k"1 m W t k = ;1, Q-a.s., we have lim k"1 n(k) = 1, Q-a.s. As n(k) t k < n(k)+1 for every k 2 Z ++ , we have e ; t k e ; n(k) and e ; t k m W n(k) e ; n(k) m W n(k) (A:3)
for every k 2 Z ++ . As < 0, (A.2) implies
Thus, (A.3) implies 0 e ; t k m X t k _ (x ; )e ; t k + e ; t k (t k _ ) + e ; n(k) m W n(k) . Taking expectations and noting that x 7 ! t k _ x is a convex function, Jensen's inequality yields 0 e ; t k E m X t k _ (x ; )e ; t k + e ; t k (t k _ E ) + Ee ; n(k) m W n(k) As < 1, Q-a.s., we have E < 1. As lim k"1 t k = 1, the rst two terms vanish. As ( n(k) ) k2Z ++ is a subsequence of ( n ) n2Z ++ , (A.1) implies lim k"1 E e ; t k m X t k _ = 0, as required.
Now consider the problem with 0. For t < 0 , R t = ;m X t_ 0 = ;m X 0 = 0 ; m W t . As x 0 and 0, we have X t = x + t + W t W t for every t 0, which implies m X t m W t for every t 0. Therefore, for t 0 , we have R t = ;m X t_ 0 = ;m X t ; m W t . Therefore, 0 e ; t E R t ; e ; t E m W t for every t 0. Using the re ection principle, we calculate that E m W t = ;(2t= ) 1=2 (Karatzas and Shreve 1988, (8.3) in Section 2.8). It follows that lim t"1 e ; t E R t = 0 .
Proof of Lemma 2.3.1. By the change of variable formula (Elliott 1982, Theorem 12. 
Using this formula, cancelling terms, and using the fact that the continuity of integrators allows us to replace Z s; by Z s , we have
(Z) T n T n (ds). Integrating by parts (Elliott 1982, Corollary 12. We now show that DF(x S) = g(x S) l ; for every x 2 (0 S ). Suppose there exists x 2 (0 S ) such that g(x S) > l ; . Then, there exists x 2 (0 S ) such that g(x S) = max x2 0 S] g(x S). It follows that Dg(x S) = 0. We also have Dg(S S) = Proof of Lemma 2.3.13. (A) Suppose (R L) solves (2.3.12). It follows from (2.3.12) that 0 Z t = X t + R t ; L t S for every t 2 < + . Consequently, conditions 2.1.4(a) and 2.1.4(c) are satis ed. Condition 2.1.4(b) will follow from the continuity of (R L) and the conventions that T 0 = 0 and inf = 1.
(i) It follows directly from (2.3.12) that R and L are non-negative and non-decreasing processes.
(ii) Consider t 2 < + . By (2.3.12), R t L t ;X t and L t X t +R t ;S. If R t = L t ;X t , then L t > X t +R t ;S. Otherwise, L t = X t +R t ;S, which implies S = 0, a contradiction. Similarly, i f L t = X t + R t ; S, then R t > L t ; X t .
( (B) We now de ne a control policy (R L) that satis es (2.3.12). Let T 0 = 0 and (T k ) k2Z ++ bean increasing positive sequence of stopping times. Let T 1 = i n f ft > 0 j X t ; x Finally, we show that the solution constructed above is unique. Suppose (R L) and (R 0 L 0 ) are distinct solutions of (2.3.12). Let ! 2 be such that T(!) = infft 2 < + j R t (!) > R 0 t (!)g < 1. By de nition, R t (!) = R 0 t (!) for every t 2 0 T (!)). Consequently, L t (!) = L 0 t (!) for every t 2 0 T (!)). By the continuity of R(!) and R 0 (!), this implies Consider the right-hand-side of (A.9). By the de nition of (R L), i.e., C is decreasing in . By analogous arguments, C is increasing in h and l. (C) Given t > 0, let C(x th 0 t l ) = E C 1 (L x th 0 t l ). Clearly, E C 1 (L x th 0 t l ) = tEC 1 (L x h 0 l ) tC(x h 0 l ) (A:10)
By a similar argument, C is super-additive in (h l):
C(x h + h 0 0 l + l 0 ) C(x h 0 l ) + C(x h 0 0 l 0 ) (A:11)
Combining (A.10) and (A.11), we see that C is concave in (h l).
(D) We divide < 2 ++ into three regions and consider each in turn.
(a) Let (x h) 2 (0 S (h)) (l 1 where p(v x) = e x cosh( (v + x)) ; sinh( (v + x))]. Elementary calculation yields D 2 p(v x) = e x ( 2 ; 2 ) sinh( (v + x)) > 0. Therefore, p(: x) > p(: 0) for every x > 0. 
